Book Reviews by Reviews, Book
Montana Law Review
Volume 29




University of Montana School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Montana
Law Review by an authorized editor of The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law.
Recommended Citation




U. S. Senator Lee Metcalf and Vic Reinemer
New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1967. Pp. 338. $5.95.
I confess to several false starts in reviewing Overcharge. The task
has been complicated by a personal regard for the authors, Senator Met-
calf and his Executive Assistant, Vic Reinemer; and it was not made
easier by some past experience as a legislator and short-lived pamphle-
teer in Montana where both the Senator and the Montana Power Com-
pany are considerable political and social forces. In short, the objectivity
which a law journal review should have has been strained for and I take
pains to admit this at the outset. If I fail in this goal for objectivity I
can only excuse myself by observing that there is no truly objective jurist
-in my experience, at least, all jurists seem to take their backgrounds
and prejudices onto the woolsack.
Most lawyers are aware that a public utility is allowed a fair rate of
return on the value of its plant and equipment, its working capital, the
value of construction work in progress, and the value of property held
for future use. The combination of these items is known as the "rate
base." In addition, a utility is allowed to obtain from the customer such
expenses as are connected with furnishing utility services. Generally
speaking these expenses include such things as maintenance, advertising,
promotion, public relations, salaries and wages, pension plans, deprecia-
tion, etc. There is a division of authority in the United States on the
formula for determining rate base, with the majority of states using orig-
inal cost of the plant less depreciation, and the minority using the actual
cost of the plant and the cost of reproducing the plant new. Just as a
matter of interest, Montana follows the minority rule.
The first premise of the book, and the one that gives it its title is that
even if one accepts the rate base, any return on that base in excess of an
arbitrary fair rate of six per cent is an overcharge. Using statistical in-
formation obtained from various sources Metcalf and Reinemer posit
that 111 of the 185 largest electric utility companies in the land had a
rate of return of seven per cent or more in 1963, and some, including
Montana Power Company, had returns in excess of ten per cent. Lest one
dismiss an excess of one per cent as of minor importance, they point out
that eight large companies each overcharged its consuming public more
than $100,000,000 from 1956 to 1962.
However startling those statistics may be, I suspect that the authors
are more disturbed by the methods used by utilities to keep the rates
high, by their ability to make the public accept the rates, by the apathy
of the public and its elected commissions, by the nature of operating ex-
penses passed on to the public, by the extremist right-wing connections
of the industry, by the nature of their charitable contributions, by their
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failure to transfer tax windfalls and operating expense windfalls back to
the public, by injection of their economic concepts into school curricula.
All of these subjects, and more, are discussed, argued and documented.
In Montana, where we are so close to the Public Service Commission and
to the utility companies, the book makes interesting, and sometimes
shocking, reading.
For example, the authors note that as a result of the electrical equip-
ment price fixing scandal of the late 1950's, utility companies by 1965
had recovered $400,000,000 which had been overpaid to manufacturers.
They contend that the utilities are still getting a six per cent plus return
on a rate base that includes original cost of such equipment and that no
credit is, or has been, given the consumer for the windfall.
A considerable portion of the book is devoted to the propaganda
activities of the investor-owned utilities. One can speculate that the
Senator, as a politician, has been on the receiving end of this kind of
propaganda, and that Vic Reinemer, as a newsman, recognizes the tech-
niques. In any case, their position seems to be that a monopolistic utility
has no real need to advertise to attract customers; that a utility certainly
shouldn't be allowed to propagandize the consumer at the consumer's ex-
pense to maintain unreasonable rates.
At the close of the book Metcalf and Reinemer propose that one so-
lution to the problem of overcharge lies in competition. Of course by
definition a public utility is an effective, legal monopoly, and consumer-
owned electric companies (R. E. A. and municipal systems) using avail-
able public power are the only sources of possible competition. The joker
is that the investor-owned utilities own the expensive transmission lines
and are not willing to let the R. E. A.'s and municipals use their lines at a
reasonable cost, and sometimes not at all. Understandably enough. The
Keating Amendment (to what is not stated) prohibits the Bureau of
Reclamation from building transmission lines into areas where the
I. 0. U.'s "have agreed to wheel the power." In addition, in many states
the I. 0. U.'s have a statutory competitive edge. (See Sec. 14-530, RCM
1947, and Montana Power Co. v. Vigilante Electric Co-op, 143 Mont. 119,
387 P.2d 718 (1963)). Implicit in this discussion of competition is the
alternative of public power, and it seems to me that this makes the rest of
the book vulnerable. Whether rightly or wrongly, and whether as a result
of intensive advertising by the industry, people tend to equate the concept
of public power with socialism. Whatever merit there is in the rest of the
book (and there is considerable) it is susceptible to effective criticism by
otherwise responsible people who will apply the magic shibboleth,
Senator Metcalf is a lawyer. Judging from his opinions while in the
Montana Supreme Court from 1946 to 1952, he is a good one. Vic Reine-
mer was a newspaper man before he became Senator Metcalf's executive
assistant. His credits indicate that he was a good one. The book has the
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flavor of partisan impartiality that every brief writer strives for, and it
has the touch of outraged public morals that every editorial writer seeks.
Together, Metcalf and Reinemer strike a good balance for a book of this
kind. As with every good brief and every good editorial, one might
expect a startling reaction to the book. Sad to say, the public does not
seem to be clamoring for reform even in the absence of an answer by the
industry. At $5.95 the book has not had wide dissemination to the con-
suming public and probably never will have.
As noted, the book is documented. Because it is a polemic rather
than a text the inquiring reader might question the authority cited and
its application. We as lawyers can treat the "facts" well pleaded as true
until they are put in issue. So far they have not been put in issue in the
same forum. An answer would be interesting.
The book is a must book for lawyers, whatever side of the fence they
occupy, if only because lawyers are by nature political-social animals. It
is especially important to Montana lawyers because none of us is ever far
removed from the shadows of the utilities and our senators. The book has
now been out long enough for us to know that public apathy on this sub-
ject is too great to be overcome by the impact of this book. (The tele-
phone company has had a recent round of hearings for rate increase with
no public opposition.) But the seed of distrust has been cast and if the
premises in the book are sound, the seed will take root somewhere, some-
time. This may be all the reward the authors will get. It should be
sufficient.
John M. Schiltz*
HUGO BLACK AND THE SUPREME COURT
Edited by Stephen Strickland
Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1967. Pp. 365, $10.00.
To the great dismay of some, Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black's
judicial philosophy cannot be easily categorized. He has been variously
described as everything from a "states' righter" to a proponent of pow-
erful central government. He has been referred to as favoring every-
thing from a broad scope of judicial review to judicial self restraint.
The purpose of Stephan Strickland's symposium is to re-examine
Justice Black and his philosophy. The nine lawyers, professors and con-
stitutional scholars which comprise the symposium analyze the paradox
that is Mr. Black and assess the impact of his thirty years of Court
service on the lives, laws, and institutions of the American people. The
*A. B., University of Montana; L.L.B., University of Montana; Partner, Law
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symposium members discuss Justice Black's approach to the changing
legal problems confronting our country and his special concerns in the
law such as racial equality, antitrust, and tax law.
Justice Black is portrayed as America's senior warrior for individual
liberty. He began his career in 1937 as Roosevelt's one man army for
promotion of the New Deal. Over the last thirty years, he has not
changed significantly, but the problems confronting our country have.
He still believes in a living, functioning democracy. For instance, Black
stands firmly convinced that the Constitution says what it means about
our civil rights and that it means what it says. Throughout his many
opinions there runs the same consistent thread: protect the individual
and his freedoms.
Although the focus of the symposium is on Hugo Black, the judge,
always close at hand is Hugo Black, the man. Many personal elements
are included such as his rural Alabama childhood, his service as a local
prosecutor and police court judge, his term in the Senate, and his mem-
bership in the Ku Klux Klan.
In the end, Strickland casts aside the multitude of labels which have
been used to describe Black in the past. The seemingly unexplainable
riddle that is Justice Black is opened by Mr. Strickland's newly discov-
ered key: that Black is a Madisonian. Madison's chief fame, as Black
himself has often acknowledged, was as "Father of the Constitution" and
as defender of every part of it. As Strickland puts it:
Thus Black can be an "absolutist," albeit "modified," in applying
the Bill of Rights; a "states' righter" in supporting the regulatory
powers of the states; a "liberal" as regards construction of the
Congressional commerce power; and a "libertarian" in applying the
law in defense of free speech, free exercise of religion, and free
exercise of belief.
Laurence E. Eck
THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY
Rita James Simon
Boston: Little, Brown and Co.; 1967. Pp. 246. $10.00.
The Jury and the Defense of Insanity, as part of the University of
Chicago Jury Project, describes the reactions of ninety-six juries to two
experimental trials involving the defense of insanity. The author is an
Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Illinois and has
served as Research Associate at the Law School, University of Chicago.
Professor Simon bases the experiment on two actual cases: a house-
breaking case, United States v. Durham, 130 F. Supp. 445, 214 F.2d 862
(1954), and an incest case, United States v. King, Dkt. No. 655-5 (D. C.
[Vol. 29
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Cir. 1956). The trials were edited and recorded; the juries were chosen
from jury pools in Chicago, St. Louis, and Minneapolis; and the jurors
were told at the outset that their deliberations would be recorded.
The study centers on the distinction between two criteria to deter-
mine legal insanity. The M'Naghten rule, a doctrine used in almost all
states and federal jurisdictions, asserts that the defendant is excused only
if he did not know what he was doing or did not know that what he was
doing was wrong. The Durham rule, adopted in the District of Columbia
in 1954, states, in brief, that a defendant is excused if his act was the
product of a mental disease or defect. The adoption of the Durham rule
was hailed by many as the beginning of a new era where the law would
work more closely with psychiatry in the disposition of criminal cases
involving the insane. But others, who were more skeptical, wondered how
the Durham rule would fare in the hands of the jury. In the attempt to
find an answer, Professor Simon divided the experimental juries into
three groups: one-third were instructed according to the M'Naghten
rule, one-third to the Durham rule, and one-third were merely told to
find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity if he were insane at
the time of the crime.
The Durham rule has been criticized on two grounds: it would in-
crease greatly the number of defendants acquitted on the grounds of
insanity and the psychiatrist's testimony would dominate the trial to such
an extent that the jury would become little more than the rubber stamp
of medical experts. Evidence from this study shows that jurors who
received no instructions as to the criterion of responsibility had the high-
est proportion of not guilty by reason of insanity verdicts. Jurors who
were exposed to the Durham rule had a slightly lower proportion, and
M'Naghten jurors were lowest. Jurors exposed to the Durham rule were
twelve percent more likely to return a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity than those exposed to M'Naghten. But the important of this fig-
ure is diminished by the fact that there was very little difference be-
tween the verdicts of uninstructed juries and Durham juries. The author
suggests that such a finding indicates that the Durham rule is closer to
a juror's natural sense of justice than the M'Naghten rule. It was also
found that Durham juries deliberated significantly longer than
M'Naghten juries. On this basis the author contends that the evidence
does not support the criticism that the Durham rule would deprive the
jury of its basic responsibility. Taken together, the findings show that
the Durham rule will fare in the hands of the jury as well as, if not better
than, the M'Naghten rule.
The author seems to share the view of most psychiatrists that the
Durham rule would improve the quality of psychiatrists' testimony and
be easier to work with in the courtroom, but she is careful to preserve the
scientific accuracy of the experiment by setting aside personal bias. In
any experiment designed to measure the reactions of many juries to a
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the trial many times without changing even the slightest detail. Pro-
fessor Simon chose to record the trial on tape as a necessary step to
maintain control of the experiment. Although recording narrows the
utility of the results to determine a jury's reaction in an actual trial, the
results are not so narrow as to be inapplicable to actual trials. The Jury
and the Defense of Insanity will be especially helpful to an attorney faced
with a trial involving the defense of insanity, but is significant and in-
formative to anyone concerned with the process by which our juries ad-
minister justice.
James P. Murphy, Jr.
LAWYERS AND JUDGES
Joel B. Grossman
New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965. Pp. 228. $6.75.
As early as 1908, the American Bar Association expressed an interest
in the Federal judicial selection process. Lawyers and Judges is a per-
ceptive analysis of the progression from this mere interest to an active
participation by the ABA in today's selection process.
Author, Joel Grossman, an assistant professor of political science at
the University of Wisconsin, analyzes the process of selecting Federal
judges prior to discussing the role of the ABA in that process. He exam-
ines extensively the political overtones of judicial selection. Since the
ABA involvement stemmed from a recognition that judicial fitness is not
always commensurate with political popularity, the author thus leads into
a historical examination of the ABA's consultant role in the judicial se-
lection process today.
The ABA's Committee on the Federal Judiciary has attained its pres-
ent position as a consultant to the Attorney General, who makes the final
recommendation to the President, largely because of its decision to tem-
porarily forego attempts to make judicial selection non-partisan. The
height of the Committee's influence was achieved during the Eisenhower
administration when it possessed a virtual veto power over unfit candi-
dates. The relative instability of the Committee's influence is shown by
its relegation to a consultant position during the Kennedy administra-
tion. Although the amount of power which the Committee has been al-
lowed has varied, Grossman believes the Committee has contributed to
a continuing improvement in the process of selection. He also feels that
from the standpoint of society, the ABA's present role as consultant is the
proper position for an independent group to maintain. If any further
power were given, such as the veto-like power of the 1950's, there would
be too much control over appointment of judges vested in a committee
with limited investigative sources and methods and over which there is
[Vol. 29
6
Montana Law Review, Vol. 29 [1967], Iss. 1, Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol29/iss1/10
BOOK REVIEWS
no public control. Also to be considered is the fact that the ABA num-
bers fewer than one-half of the lawyers in the nation as its members.
The exhaustive research that went into Lawyers and Judges is evi-
denced by the large number of illustrative tables and the references to
personal interviews conducted by the author. The book is well organized
and, though it is by no means as readable as a novel, it does maintain the
reader's interest throughout. The author's avowed intention to raise
questions rather than to give answers was only partically successful in
that most of the questions raised were also thoroughly answered.
For the practicing lawyer, the worth of this book is twofold. First,
Lawyers and Judges gives a detailed description of how the Federal judges
before whom he practices are selected. Second, the book serves to show
how he may have a voice in that selection process.
Gary L. Graham
PSYCHIATRY AND CRIMINAL LAW
ILLUSIONS, FICTIONS, AND MYTHS
Sol Rubin
Dobbs Ferry, N. Y.: Oceana Publications Incorporated, 1965. Pp. 219. $6.00.
Mr. Rubin begins his examination of the interrelationship of
psychiatry and criminal law by discussing the relative merits of the
M'Naughten Rule and the Durham Rule. These are the principal rules
used by courts to determine whether a defendant can be held responsible
for his unlawful act. The M'Naughten Rule states that a defendant is
not criminally responsible if he was incapable of knowing whether his
act was right or wrong. The more recently announced Durham Rule
exculpates those who committed a crime while "suffering from a mental
disease or defect which produced the unlawful act."
While at first glance the latter rule seems to be more liberal and
progressive, Mr. Rubin points out that in practicality the Durham Rule
does not result in a more just and humane treatment of mentally ill of-
fenders. Durham Rule jurisdictions often require automatic committment
to a state mental hospital for an indefinite period following exculpation
in criminal proceedings. An offender subjected to this civil confinement
is not eligible for parole, and due to overcrowding of state mental facili-
ties the treatment afforded such patients is usually limited to confine-
ment. In addition the offender is often confined longer than he would
have been under criminal statutes. As a result many defendants in Dur-
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Mr. Rubin believes that all jurisdictions should use the M'Naughten
Rule because its application is limited to defendants who have serious
mental disabilities. If the M'Naughten Rule is followed, offenders suffer-
ing from less serious forms of mental illness will be sentenced under crim-
inal laws. He argues that a psychiatrically-oriented correction system
would be best for most mentally disturbed defendants, and that penal
institutions are quite capable of providing adequate psychiatric care for
persons with less serious mental problems.
In the author's opinion the Model Sentencing Act would insure that
most mentally ill defendants would be sentenced to penal institutions.
The Act is designed to fit the sentence imposed to the individual offender.
In all felony cases a pre-sentence social investigation is made to determine
which offenders pose a real threat to society. Such persons are labelled
"dangerous offenders." They are persons who commit crimes which en-
danger the lives of others, and who suffer from severe personality dis-
orders that indicate a propensity for crime. A complete psychiatric
report on all such "dangerous offenders" must be furnished a judge be-
fore he pronounces sentence.
The maximum sentence for "dangerous offenders" is thirty years and
for others it is five. In theory, extremely long sentences provide more
problems for prison administrators and very little rehabilitation, while
shorter sentences are sufficient for social retraining. A minimum sen-
tence is never required, and even "dangerous offenders" can be paroled
at any time. Mentally ill "non-dangeTous offenders" would receive short
criminal sentences. The author feels this is preferable to the indeterminate
civil confinement awaiting them in Durham Rule jurisdictions should the
defendants acknowledge their mental problems. Application of the Act is
also discussed in relation to problems of sentencing sex offenders, nar-
cotics addicts, and recidivists. Mr. Rubin demonstrates how the Act
would provide more intelligent and flexible sentencing procedures than
present systems.
Mr. Rubin argues persuasively in support of his thesis and in so
doing illuminates many important problem areas. However, the book is
basically an argument in support of the Model Sentencing Act and is too
one-sided. The discussion of the problems concerning sentencing of men-
tally ill offenders makes book worth reading, but it is not recommended









Lawrence P. Tiffany, Donald M. McIntyre, Jr., and Daniel L. Rottenberg
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967. Pp. 286. $10.00.
In the procedural journey to a successful criminal prosecution, the
police officer usually takes the first step, that of detecting the crime
and making the arrest. The authors of Detection of Crime* offer a
systematic study of detection practices used by the police departments of
Chicago and Detroit. Throughout the book the authors repeatedly ask
whether these practices fulfill the legitimate desire of police to be ef-
fective, and the judiciary's commitment to a system which conforms to
appropriate standards of fairness.
Although the authors do not arrive at an ultimate answer, they do
provide an in-depth study of police practices in the areas of Stopping
and Questioning, Search and Seizure, and Encouragement and Entrap-
ment. This study revealed, for example, that police do stop people on
mere "suspicion"; that lacking probable cause, they do search without a
warrant; and that they do aggressively tempt women to solicit them.
But the book does not limit its criticism to police practices. The
authors note that some administrative and judicial procedures now re-
quired are ill-designed to cope with many crimes. For example, the vic-
timless crimes involving narcotics traffic, liquor violations, prostitution
and homosexuality can be committed with disturbing the surface tran-
quility of the community. Their perpetrators can easily dispose of in-
criminating evidence. Hence, the strict evidentiary requirements neces-
sary to obtain a search warrant, and the time consumed in so doing, often
make such a procedure futile. As a result, warrants are used primarily
when police desire to prosecute only the upper echelon of an organized
syndicate. In such a case, the warrant is applied for only after a sys-
tematic study of the organization's movements and practices. The war-
rant then enables the police to make simultaneous raids, and insures that
the evidence seized will be admissible in court.
Procedural law is not the only cause of police frustration. In many
cases the definition of the substantive crime contributes to the dilemma.
To illustrate this problem, the authors point to the crime of solicitation.
In many states it is uncertain whether the crime is committed by all
women who engage in sexual intercourse for money or only those who
engage in aggressive public solicitation. This ambiguity forces the police
to act at their peril in choosing acceptable detection methods. Judicial
interpretations which define only what the crime is not, shed little light
on the positive elements required for conviction. To partially correct
this, the authors suggest that both police and legislatures take greater
initiative in the positive formulation of acceptable practices.
*This book is part of the Administration of Justice Series. See 28 Mont. L. Rev.
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The reader of Detection of Crime will be disappointed if he looks for
an answer to every question posed. But he will become more aware of
current police practices and problems. By informing the readers, the
authors have achieved their purpose of aiding in the establishment of
crime detection methods which are effective and yet in accord with ap-
propriate standards of fairness.
Thomas A. Harney
A NEW LOOK AT CONFESSIONS: ESCOBEDO-THE SECOND
ROUND
Edited by B. James George, Jr.
Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute of Continuing Legal Education, 1967. Pp. 304.
$20.00
A New Look at Confessions is a commentary on the renowned Miranda
decision. Miranda, decided in June of 1966, pronounced a "new set of
standards governing introduction in evidence of statements obtained from
the defendant through police interrogation." The Institute of Continuing
Legal Education conducted national seminars on the meaning and pros-
pective effects of Miranda. Lectures and group discussions presented at
the seminars compose the material for the book.
Miranda holds that statements obtained by police from criminal de-
fendants during "custodial interrogation" will not be admitted into evi-
dence unless the privilege against self-incrimination has been effectively
safeguarded. The police must warn the defendant that he has a right to
remain silent, that anything he says may be used as evidence against him
and that he has a right to counsel, either retained or appointed, during
interrogation. Failure to give these warnings will render any statements
elicited during interrogation inadmissible as evidence.
Custodial interrogation was defined in Miranda as, "questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way." Judge George Edwards, United States Circuit Court of Appeals
(Sixth Circuit), suggested that "the warnings may be required in situa-
tions other than station house interrigations." Whether the warnings
must be given depends on the circumstances in each case. The Honorable
Thomas C. Linch, Attorney General of California, articulated the criterion
with which to determine whether the warnings must be given. He said
that "compulsion [is] the new standard." If a situation arises in which
the defendant's Constitutional rights may be prejudiced through com-
pulsion by the police, the warnings must be given.
A statement made during custodial interrogation, to be admitted
into evidence, must demonstrate that the defendant has made an effective
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waiver of his rights. Miranda states: "[T] he defendant may waive effec-
tuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently. If the waiver is not unequivocally shown
there will be a presumption of illegitimacy of the evidence, and the con-
fession or statement will not be admitted." It has been suggested that
valid waivers, measured by the criteria established in Miranda, will be
almost impossible to establish. Most authorities, including Judge Edwards,
do not believe that it will be that difficult.
Several methods for overcoming the "presumed illegitimacy" of
waivers have been suggested. The use of a printed form has been exten-
sively advocated. The signed document will not be conclusive proof of a
valid waiver for the court will inquire into the background, conduct and
experience of the accused. If it appears that there was no knowledgeable
waiver, the confession will be discarded. Prof. B. James George, Jr., of the
University of Michigan Law School, warned that many criminal prosecu-
tions may be prejudiced if the police consider the form a panacea and
follow it by rote. The interrogator must be sensitive to the particular
circumstances of each case. If there is any doubt about the efficacy of
the weiver it is probable that any statement made pursuant to it will be
barred as evidence.
Justice Edward E. Pringle, Colorado Supreme Court, endorsed the
use of magistrates similar to that required by Rule 5 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Under this system the defendant would be taken
before a magistrate who would explain his constitutional rights. The
magistrate would determine whether the waiver was knowing and volun-
tary. Proponents of this method maintain that the magistrate would be
a disinterested third party, who would reduce the possibility of coercion,
in the police dominated atmosphere in which compulsion breeds.
The jurists, law professors, and law enforcement officials are not in
unanimity in interpreting Miranda, or in answering the questions which
it raises. The lectures and group discussions, from which the material for
the book was taken, were held only a few months after Miranda was de-
cided. Consequently, the authors could only support their propositions
with theory and informed conjecture. Some of the potential problems
they wrestled with may never develop.
A New Look at Confessions is an understandable analysis of Miranda.
It is not a technical guide for criminal procedure but a general presen-
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At the completion of Spring Semester, 1968, Professor David R. Mason
retired as a full-time professor of law at the University of Montana. He
thus concluded a period of service to the University which began in 1927.
The contributions and achievements of this man during his professional
career have been discussed at length elsewhere. What has not been men-
tioned, and what the Montana Law Review wishes to acknowledge at this
time, is the role Professor Mason has played in the successful publication
of the Law Review at the University of Montana.
In 1939 Professor Mason was the Acting Dean of the law School. In
that position he gave formal approval and support to the first issue of the
Montana Law Review. Since that time, Professor Mason has been the larg-
est single contributor to this publication. He has authored or co-authored
nine articles, and has acted in an advisory capacity on countless others.
In gratitude for our first breath of life, and for this continuing source
of scholarship and wisdom, the editorial staff of the Montana Law Re-
view is honored to dedicate this issue to Professor Mason.
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